[extract] In this article I will first analyse the concept of Corporate Governance and show that it is an increasingly complex amalgam of legal and self regulation. Some reasons for the complexity are that the law has undergone various paradigm shifts over time which have not been adequately noted by commentators and these necessarily impact on the role of the judges. Added to this has been the process of rapid change which has often seemed excessive and even gratuitous. Further, there has been an international movement towards self regulation of this and related areas. Over this now hangs the shadow of recent corporate collapses which casts grave doubts about the ultimate efficacy of self regulation. These developments raise questions about the justiciability of modern corporate governance, whether there are alternatives to conventional adjudication and what the role of the judges should be.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE JUDGES *

Introduction
In this article I will first analyse the concept of Corporate Governance and show that it is an increasingly complex amalgam of legal and self regulation. Some reasons for the complexity are that the law has undergone various paradigm shifts over time which have not been adequately noted by commentators and these necessarily impact on the role of the judges. Added to this has been the process of rapid change which has often seemed excessive and even gratuitous. Further, there has been an international movement towards self regulation of this and related areas. Over this now hangs the shadow of recent corporate collapses which casts grave doubts about the ultimate efficacy of self regulation. These developments raise questions about the justiciability of modern corporate governance, whether there are alternatives to conventional adjudication and what the role of the judges should be.
I shall review three recent high profile cases, HIH, NRMA and ONE-TEL where the courts have played a valuable role and shall also review the traditional role of the courts in shareholder disputes which raises questions of case management. I shall then consider whether the courts have a role in enforcing self regulation and what use can be made of self regulation in legal proceedings. Lastly, I shall consider the wisdom of using serving judges for royal commissions in this area in light of the experience in HIH and then attempt some overall conclusions.
The Concept of Corporate Governance
'Corporate Governance' is a term that has been in circulation for the last twenty years and its present use emanates from the USA although it is now truly international. 1 'Corporate Governance' was used, probably for the first time, in 1962, by Richard Eells of Columbia Business School in his book The Government of Corporations. 2 'The Study of Corporate Governance' was the subject of Chapter 1. Now it is a fashionable concept, and like many fashionable concepts, it is somewhat ambiguous and a bit of a cliché. In its narrower, and most usual, sense it refers to control of corporations and to systems of accountability by those in control. It refers to the companies legislation but it also transcends the law because we are looking not only at legal control but also de facto control of corporations. We are also looking at accountability, not only in terms of legal restraints but also in terms of systems of self-regulation and the norms of so called 'best practice'. Self-regulation starts off as a simple concept but becomes progressively more complex. Added to this we have business ethics. The relationship can be represented as in Figure 1 
The Economic Importance of Corporate Governance
The OECD has recently made the following points about the economic importance of corporate governance: 6 1. There is the link between corporate governance and investment and economic growth. It is not only the quantity of investment which matters. It is how efficiently this is allocated and monitored. Corporate governance has a crucial impact on all three. 
Legal regulation
2.
The law component influences how we mobilize capital by defining property rights and guaranteeing credible information.
3.
Corporate governance as a whole is seen as a constituent element of equity risk. Bad corporate governance signals information asymmetry and high probability of expropriation of shareholder value.
4.
A McKinsey study of July 2002 showed the average premium that the overwhelming majority of investors will be willing to pay for companies with good corporate governance.
5.
The market can only make the best decisions regarding allocation of capital if there is a proper disclosure. Effective monitoring depends on sound procedures, clear lines of authority and incentive schemes.
Globalisation affects this because of the: Growing importance of the private sector Growing international institutional investment Growing international interdependence through technology Changing patterns of competition
The Shifting Basis of the Legal Core 7
Early corporate law was based on the privilege approach 8 which was a public law approach. The granting or recognition of incorporation was a privilege granted by the state on certain conditions which had to be complied with. Public law writs of Quo Warranto and Scire Facias applied. This was the dominant approach in English corporate law until the nineteenth century when the freedom of contract and utility approach began to be advocated. 9 The freedom of contract and utility approach is essentially a private law and private ordering approach. The earliest legislation along the freedom of contract and utility lines was the 1844 English Act which was later supplemented by the Limited Liability Act 1855 and superseded by the first modern Companies Act of 1862. This legislation provided a liberal regime based on compliance with certain minimal statutory requirements and registration with a public official. The substance of corporate law made extensive use of equity concepts, especially the trust and fiduciary concept. The fiduciary concept has been interpreted by the law and economics movement as an elaborate standard form contract to obviate the necessity for thousands of individual contracts separately negotiated. 10 The use of such concepts enabled the law to cope with the development of company promotion and directors' duties. A combination of these concepts and primitive political concepts of majority rule provided the basis for the law relating to shareholders' rights and company meetings. 11 Traditional corporate law was thus more modern than much recent corporate legislation in the sense that it was simpler and more flexible, and facilitated freedom of contract subject to minimal restraints.
The general trend of corporate law since then has been ever-increasing legislation, particularly regulatory legislation based on the disclosure concept. Nevertheless, a substantial amount of corporate law has remained case law and it can be said that the deep structure of the law has remained an equity-based system built on the ideas of contract, association, and restraint on abuse of power. The increasing tendency, however, has been to gloss or supersede this by statute, and we reach a stage when we have to ask the question of what the price will be as we switch to a substantially statute-based system. Do we cut ourselves adrift from the old equity-based system with its known concepts? What is the deep structure of the new legislation? What are its conceptual underpinnings? Are they changing?
One of the reasons for the modern development has been the growth of regulation.
Initially this was the adoption of a simple policy of disclosure which was superimposed on an essentially private law system. 12 Subsequently the system has grown increasingly elaborate and has become a system of administrative regulation and bureaucracy. 13 If one looks at the United States experience, the growth of administrative regulation of securities has gone side by side with the increasing flexibility of the corporate law statutes. The argument is that the subject matter of capital markets and securities requires more complex laws. 14 On the other hand, some writers in the law and economics movement point to the selfinterest of politicians and public servants and indeed the corporate bar in pursuing the goal of regulation. 15 Each of these groups has its own self-interest to 
The Justiciability of Modern Corporate Governance
Is the subject matter of modern corporate governance properly justiciable?
Although as we shall see the matter to some extent can be regarded as a constitutional question, it is probably better to start by considering it from the point of view of principle. The judicial function is definable within limits.
The Oxford English Dictionary 25 defines justiciability as 'liable to be tried in a court of justice; subject to jurisdiction'. Not only are these bad definitions, they are manifestly question begging.
The best judicial analysis of justiciability is in the judgement of Kitto J in The Queen v Trade Practices Tribunal; ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd 26 where he is talking about the judicial power under the Commonwealth constitution. His Honour said "A judicial power involves, as a general rule, a decision settling for the future, as between defined persons or classes of persons, a question as to the existence of a right or obligation, so that an exercise of the power creates a new charter by reference to which that question is in future to be decided as between those persons or classes of persons. In other words, the process to be followed must generally be an inquiry concerning the law as it is and the facts as they are, followed by an application of the law as determined to the facts as determined; and the end to be reached must be an act which, so long as it stands, entitles and obliges the persons between whom it intervenes, to observance of the rights and obligations that the application of law to facts has shown to exist. It is right, I think to conclude from the cases on the subject that a power which does not involve such a process and lead to such an end needs to possess some special compelling feature if its inclusion in the category of judicial power is to be justified."
This serves as a workable definition for many purposes but the High Court has subsequently acknowledged that it is almost impossible to develop an exhaustive "To sum up: there are two interlocking questions involved in the notion of 'justiciability' when it functions as an appraising term: (1) How far is it possible to make the concept of 'judicial' methods precise? and (2) How far is it possible to specify situations or disputes which are inherently suitable to such methods? To the first question one answer seems clear: namely that the common law courts have failed to provide us with a single set of reasonably unambiguous criteria for calling a procedure 'judicial'. Moreover, many of the tests historically enunciated by the courts are now insufficiently precise to discriminate within a large penumbra of doubtful cases, and too great an element of chance enters into the question of classification where there is no specific guidance by the Legislature. As to judicial methods it is clear that certain (admittedly imprecise) characteristics -for example, objectivity of decision, independence of administrative or popular pressure, and finality of conclusions -have been regarded as necessary ingredients of judicial processes as distinct from discretionary or legislative ones; and there must have been some motives operating upon legislators who have provided for what they intended to be procedures of the first rather than of the second kind. Perhaps, then, the notions and occasions in question may best be made more precise by attempting to specify negatively, and in as neutral a way as possible, circumstances and motives which have led to the deliberate avoidance of such adjudicatory procedures and to the description of procedures and issues as involving 'policy' or administrative discretion."
If we turn to corporate governance what we see is that the legal core of corporate governance consisting of statutory rules and caselaw rules and principles has traditionally been regarded as justiciable. Indeed it was left to the courts to fill in the substantial gaps left by the legislation in terms of directors' fiduciary and other duties, and shareholder remedies. The criminalisation of directors' duties was never wholeheartedly endorsed by the courts for good reasons and it has now been left to the courts to deal with the relatively few civil penalty cases which are 27 (1995) brought to court. Court proceedings of any sort are expensive and occasion delay. ASIC prefers to avoid them if possible for these reasons and uses its administrative powers wherever possible 30 and is seeking power to impose its own penalties. The statutory reforms to the Takeovers Panel have taken the jurisdiction in that area away from the courts. This needs to be considered as does the question whether the courts have a role in respect of self regulation. However, before we turn to that, let us briefly consider the constitutional question and how this is related to the question of justiciability.
The Commonwealth and State constitutions are based on the principle of separation of powers. 31 As a side issue to this we currently lack a coherent theoretical explanation of judicial law making as Justice Dyson Heydon 32 has recently pointed out in Quadrant and The Australian Bar Review.
Following from separation of powers is the argument that Parliament must not interfere with the judicial process and the strict view of the types of non judicial functions that may be carried out by persons who are federal judges. 33 This seems to be capable of extension to State judiciary. 34 These arguments hitherto have generally been used to attack proposals to vest adjudicative powers in bodies other than courts, fetter judicial discretion and to cut back on the extra curial activities of judges. 35 I shall return to this theme when I consider the arguments about judges serving on royal commissions.
Three Recent High Profile Cases
Three recent corporate situations highlight the importance of the continuing role of the courts in corporate governance where self regulation fails and in one case the problem of having a Royal Commission running concurrently with legal proceedings in the same matter. The three situations are the HIH and ONE-TEL collapses and the continuing disfunctional governance of NRMA. 
HIH
36
HIH has been the subject of the Royal Commission. 37 It is the largest corporate collapse in Australian history with considerable social impact. The prime cause of HIH's failure was that it did not have adequate reserves against future claims. Its UK branch ran out of control and then it compounded these problems by its takeover of FAI which brought with it a host of further problems. These problems were brought about by arrogance, greed and stupidity and then later panic.
ASIC preempted the Royal Commission's findings by bringing civil penalty proceedings in November 2001 in respect of matters consequent to the FAI takeover and is now pursuing criminal charges in respect of market offences. The facts, which are complex are summarized in the Figure 2 and are taken from the report in 41 ACSR 72. 38 The proceedings related to a payment in June 2000 of $10m by HIHC to Pacific Eagle Equity Pty Ltd (PEE) and subsequent investments by PEE using that sum. Adler was the sole director of PEE and Adler Corp the only shareholder. Some three weeks after the payment, the Australian Equities Unit Trust (AEUT) was constituted, with PEE as trustee. HIHC was issued with units in AEUT at an issue price of $10m. Adler Corp was issued with units at an issue price of $25,000. AEUT made the following investments:
Figure 2 HIH Insurance Ltd (HIH)
approximately $4m was used to acquire HIH shares (purchased by PEE before the AEUT trust deed was completed or subscribed to by HIHC); venture capital unlisted investments (dstore, Planet Soccer and Nomad) were purchased from Adler Corp at the price paid for them by Adler Corp; and; loans were made to entities associated with Adler and/or Adler Corp.
The $10m payment to PEE was made in such a way that it would not come to the attention of HIH directors other than Adler, Williams and Fodera. There was no proper documentation in place in relation to the payment at the time that it was made. There was no collective disclosure -either prior to the $10m payment or AEUT making the above investments -to the board of HIH, or to the HIH Investment Committee, which was responsible for overseeing investment decisions of the HIH Group. None of the transactions were approved or ratified by the Investment Committee, nor was AEUT's investment mandate approved, despite this being a requirement of the Investment Committee's guidelines. Self regulation had conspicuously failed when confronted by self interest and increasing panic as the group's affairs declined.
ASIC sought declarations of contravention of the Corporations Act 2001 and compensation orders, civil penalties and orders for disqualification from acting as a director. The defendants disputed several matters of fact alleged by ASIC, claimed that the contraventions had not been made out and that, among other things, the payment of $10m was from the outset impressed with a trust in favour of HIHC. Each of the defendants also invoked the business judgment rule under s 180(2) in relation to the allegations of breaches of the duty of care under s 180(1).
None of the defendants elected to give evidence, and submitted that the court should decline to draw adverse inferences from such election. Santow J found contraventions by Adler, Adler Corporation and Williams of s 209(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (financial benefit to related party) and also s 260D(2) (financial assistance to acquire shares).
He further found that Adler had contravened ss 180(1), 181(1), 182(1) and 183(1) in respect of the payment of $10 million by HIHC to PEE and its use to acquire shares in HIH and shares in dstore, Planet Soccer and Nomad. Williams had contravened ss 180(1) and 182(1) and Adler s 182(2) because he was involved in contravention by Williams. Fodera contravened s 180. The business judgement defence in s 180(2) was not available to the defendants in the circumstances.
In a later judgement his honour dealt in detail with the principles which applied to penalties. He identified propositions 40 which can be derived from the authorities. These are set out in Appendix 1 to this paper.
Adler was disqualified for 20 years and ordered to pay $450,000 penalties. Williams was disqualified for 10 years and ordered to pay $250,000. Fodera was not disqualified but was ordered to pay $5000.
These were important findings and his honour is to be congratulated on his speed and diligence. An appeal was heard in the New South Wales Court of Appeal and in addition Adler has been committed to stand trial for stock market manipulation and false and misleading statements in relation to securities. The appeal was heard before the Royal Commission's Report was completed.
The Court of Appeal 41 upheld Adler's appeal against the finding that he had breached s183 of the Corporations Act (wrongly using information obtained as a company officer) but confirmed all other breaches decided by Santow J against Adler and Williams. The court also upheld the disqualifications, pecuniary penalties and compensation ordered against the defendants, subject to a recalculation of the interest component of the compensation. The court disagreed with Santow J's conclusion that the equitable test of causation applied to compensation orders under section 1317H of the Corporations Act 2001. The matter was to be determined by interpretation of the legislation. The Court awarded costs of the appeal to ASIC (which are additional to the approximately $600,000 costs payable to ASIC in relation to the original proceedings).
The Royal Commission's three volume report was published shortly before Easter, 2003. The report shows the effects of mismanagement on a colossal scale unchecked by effective supervision by a board which should have known better. The vanity and folly of former HIH chief executive director Ray Williams and fellow director Rodney Adler should have been monitored more effectively. There was lack of due process, limits on authority, independent critical analysis and management of conflict of interest. There was lack of information to the board and proper accounting. The social consequences of the failure have been substantial, but so far there has been little political fallout. The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, while it did not cause or contribute to the HIH collapse, has been shown to be a very ineffective regulator of the insurance sector and has been recast as a regulatory commission. The passive role of ASIC is accepted by the report, although this is debatable. The report says that the role of the minister should be reduced. While it recommends further civil penalty proceedings against a number of officers it also recommends criminal charges against four officers. The firm of Arthur Andersen is criticized for relying too uncritically on HIH management. The report recommends tougher rules on auditor independence, rewriting of relevant accounting standards and auditor staff rotation. Justice Owen thought HIH was not a case where wholesale fraud and embezzlement abounded, but it was mismanaged on a scale that was reprehensible. Gross negligence took place. There was a chronic lack of reserves and poor risk management. Then there were unwise expansions overseas and acquisitions.
From a corporate governance point of view the best parts of the report are the critical assessments at the beginning and parts of Chapters 6, 15 and 23. The first gives the judge's overview, which, in the absence of an executive summary, is particularly useful. Chapter 6 deals with corporate governance in general, Chapter 15 deals specifically with under-provisioning for claims and Chapter 23 with other governance aspects. One very useful point made by Justice Owen is the lack of clarity over the definition of "officer" and the responsibilities of executives.
NRMA
The attempt at demutualisation and subsequent corporate governance of NRMA is a horror story. There have been over 60 directors in 10 years. There was a split on the board over the initial documentation which was held to be misleading and deceptive. This led to professional negligence claims against Dyson Heydon QC as he then was, Allen Allen and Hemsley and Abbotts Tout. 42 At first instance Giles J held them liable in a judgment longer than the average legal text book on Torts. 43 This was the subject of a successful appeal to a Court of Appeal constituted by expert judges from out of state. 44 Later the chairman, Nick Whitlam, was held liable by Gzell J for civil penalty for breach of duty as director and chairman over the non use of proxies. 45 The Court of Appeal overturned the orders made against Whitlam. 45a The appeal seemed to turn on the capacity in which Whitlam had acted when he dealt with the proxies.
The court thought that it was in the role of chair rather than director. This was specifically covered by the Corporations Act and did not fall under the general directors' civil penalty provisions. This seems a very technical distinction out of line with assumptions of the commercial world. ASIC is now applying for leave to appeal to the High Court.
The board last year split into three factions and the NRMA CEO said "the board is working themselves into a position of being irrelevant, frankly." 46 There have since been dramatic board changes after further court involvement at meetings attended by less than 10% of the members. Only about 3% of NRMA's 2 million members voted for or against the resolutions. Another 4% provided undirected proxies to the Chairman. Meetings of members are costing NRMA $8 million each time. The New South Wales judges have made increasingly critical comments about the internecine warfare which now requires legislative intervention to arrest this waste of NRMA's funds. 47 The Australian Shareholders Association has also said that if the skirmishing looks set to continue the Government will need to consider stepping in and seeking the appointment of an administrator. Now, in a good system of corporate governance dirty washing of this kind would have laundered in the company and not hung out to dry in the courts and in public. Nevertheless the courts performed a valuable role in all three episodes and in resolution of the disputes. Self regulation had conspicuously failed.
ONE-TEL 48
The collapse of One-Tel is another striking example of the failure of self regulation. The affairs of the group were carried out in a cavalier fashion and important information seems to have been withheld from the board. This raised, amongst other questions, the role of the chairman. Hitherto the position of chair has been thought of in narrow technical terms about the law of meetings and whether the chairman has any authority to bind the company. In recent years, however, as Sir Adrian Cadbury and Henry Bosch have documented, the role of the chair in listed companies has become more important.
In a recent decision in ASIC v Rich, 49 Austin J refused an application by John Greaves, the former Chairman of One-Tel to strike out the claim brought against him by ASIC in civil penalty proceedings. ASIC argued that the chairman had to committees and the like in litigation which will no doubt ensue from the recent failures.
What these situations demonstrate is that self regulation sometimes fails and there is no alternative to court involvement. Self regulation lacks an effective system of sanctions which can only be provided by the courts. In the case of HIH retribution has been swift. There was not time and perhaps inclination for minority shareholders to seek redress. ASIC took prompt action and is engaged in seeking civil and criminal penalties in a pretty clear case. The Royal Commission, if anything, is an expensive side show. In the case of NRMA the courts have been continually involved in sorting out a disfunctional board at great expense to the organisation. This is a different role but made necessary by the common cause, the failure of the self regulatory regime.
The Experience of Takeovers
Whereas HIH, NRMA and One-Tel show the courts performing a valuable role, the history of takeovers demonstrates the contrary. Resort to the courts was an expensive tactic which impeded the speedy resolution of takeovers.
The vesting of powers of investigation and adjudication of unacceptable conduct in a takeover in the NCSC was found to be undesirable. Nevertheless the performance of the panel was regarded as unsatisfactory and it was reconstituted by the Corporate Law Economic Reform Act 1999. Provisions were introduced to prevent court proceedings of most kinds during the period of the bid. The aim was stated in s 659 AA to make the Panel "the main forum for resolving disputes about a takeover bid until the bid period has ended." 53 The policy is to create a more responsive body that can quickly and efficiently resolve takeover disputes, thereby reducing the costs for the parties involved and ensuring that the outcome of the bid can be decided by the proper arbiters -the shareholders. 54 This policy demonstrates the negative approach to justiciability which Marshall talked about. 55 simply that the legislature thinks that there are policy reasons for treating them as such.
The courts have not been entirely excluded. The Panel itself may refer questions of law to the courts under s.659A. Otherwise there is very limited locus standi to commence proceedings in relation to a bid during a bid.
The provisions, however, are not all that simple. Added to this is the residual risk of a constitutional challenge. 56 It is interesting to contrast these checkered developments with the long history of successful self regulation in the City of London and the reluctance of the English courts to intervene by way of judicial review except in retrospect in respect of real injustice. 57 This jurisdiction is exercised by declaration to enable the Panel not to repeat any error or to relieve individuals of any disciplinary consequences of an erroneous decision. 58 That system has worked well but perhaps is not for export to Australia because of the more adversarial and litigious local culture here.
It will be interesting to see how long the new system lasts here given this culture.
The Judges' Role in Self Regulation
Takeovers are now substantially dealt with outside the courts unless someone challenges the consitutional basis of the present system.
There is no obvious provision for judicial involvement in the IFSA Blue Book or Corporate Practices and Conduct. 59 As we have seen the English courts have exercised some minimalist judicial review of the City of London Takeover Code which exists entirely as self regulation. The English courts have also referred to self regulation to determine the standard of care of auditors and whether conduct in breach of the Takeover Code made it just and equitable to wind up a company. 60 the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had negligently audited a company's accounts and they had relied on this and suffered loss. The plaintiffs relied heavily on the statements of Accounting Practice. Woolf J said 61 "While they are not conclusive, so that a departure from their terms necessarily involves a breach of the duty of care, and they are not as the explanatory foreword makes clear, rigid rules, they are very strong evidence as to what is the proper standard which should be adopted and unless there is some justification, a departure from this will be regarded as constituting a breach of duty. It appears to me important that this should be the position because third parties in reading the accounts are entitled to assume that they have been drawn up in accordance with the approved practice unless there is some indication in the accounts which clearly states that this is not the case".
In Lloyd Cheynham & Co Ltd v Littlejohn & Co
In ASIC v Rich 62 Austin J had regard to contemporary community expectations in assessing the standard of care of a company chairman.
Re St Piran Ltd 63 was a motion to strike out a petition for winding up on the just and equitable ground on the basis that it was embarrassing, an abuse of the process of the court and disclosed no reasonable ground for relief. The petition had been brought by the Secretary of State for Trade. Dillon J. adjourned the motion to allow amendments to particularize the matters relied on in an Inspectors' Report. A second point concerned the breach by St. Piran of the Takeover Code and directions of the Panel. Dillon J said: 64 "I turn to the second point which is directed at paragraph 8 of the petition. It is said for St. Piran that the directions of the City Panel have no legislative sanction and that the failure of Mr Raper and Gasco or their associates to make a bid for the entire share capital of St. Piran as directed by the panel was not an act or omission, let alone a default or misconduct, on the part of St. Piran itself or on the part of its management as such. Therefore, it is said, paragraph 8 could never provide grounds for a winding up order and should be struck out. I do not take such a narrow view. The court has jurisdiction to order the winding up of a company on a contributary's petition if it is just and equitable that the company should be wound up. The words "just and equitable" are wide general words to be construed generally and taken at their face value. The provisions of the City code set out a code of conduct which has been laid down by responsible and experienced persons in the City as being fair and reasonable conduct in relation to companies which, like St. Piran, have obtained the benefit of a public quotation on the Stock Exchange. If the directors of a publicly quoted company or the principal shareholders in such a company choose to flout that code of fair and reasonable conduct and to ignore without good reason the consequent directions of the City Panel, and the minority shareholders are injured by the withdrawal of the Stock Exchange quotation for the company's shares, then it seems to me that it could very well be just and equitable in the natural sense of those words that the company should be wound up. Whether in any case a winding up order should be made would depend on a full investigation of the facts of the particular case. That is a matter for the hearing of the petition and not for this motion". In Australia certain types of self regulation are given statutory force which means that they are a kind of hybrid, enforceable in the courts. Section 793C of the Corporations Act 2001 gives ASIC, a market licensee or an aggrieved person locus standi to apply to the court to enforce the ASX's operating rules. Section 793C(2)(b) expressly empowers the courts to make orders directing directors of listed companies to ensure that their company complies with the Listing Rules. See also the power of the courts to make orders under section 1101B(1) and (4).
What all this amounts to in Australia is probably three things, first an express statutory jurisdiction in certain areas, secondly, a residual role in judicial review 65 of proceedings under the ASX's Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations, the IFSA's Blue Book 65a and Corporate Practices and Conduct 66 and thirdly, the reference to self regulation in the assessment of directors' and auditors' duties.
Two other possible developments are the adoption of sentencing guidelines by the judges on the pattern of the US Federal Sentencing Guidelines where the existence of a compliance program is a mitigating factor to be taken into account. 67 It is also likely that in any event this kind of factor will be taken into account in determining whether a company has a "corporate culture" which led to non compliance for the purposes of the Commonwealth Criminal Code Act 1995 which now applies to criminal matters under the Corporations Act 2001. 68
Shareholder Remedies and the Judges
My colleague Laurence Boulle and I have dealt with this topic in depth elsewhere 69 and I will merely summarize some of our main arguments here. Just as we have seen that in general there were paradigm shifts from a public law/privilege approach to a private ordering approach and then to a public law/administrative regulatory approach, so too we can identify paradigmatic shifts The experience of former judges in Western Australia and Queensland "conducting inquiries in the midst of political grapeshot" 83 reinforces the wisdom of not appointing serving judges and even of former judges avoiding such appointments.
To me a more relevant question is whether royal commissions serve any useful purpose which justifies the cost (including opportunity cost) of their appointment. This needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The HIH Royal Commission has cost nearly $40 million.
Conclusions
Corporate governance represents a new look at an old area and is a complex amalgam of legal and self-regulation. It is not the only area of law to receive this treatment. Broadcasting, telecommunications, privacy and Trade Practices are other examples. The interface of legal and self-regulation raises new challenges for the courts.
The courts need to be aware of the context in which these developments are taking place. In this area we are seeing major paradigm shifts: The courts need to react constructively to the increased administrative regulatory role of ASIC and systems of self-regulation and to consider the interface with law and what role they can play in ensuring the success of the new regime 84 . Failing this, Parliament might resort to drastic tactics such as shutting out the courts as it has done substantially with Takeovers in the absence of a constitutional challenge.
There is something very striking in the juxtaposition of the speedy adjudication by Santow J of the initial HIH proceedings and the subsequent sentencing, and the laborious processes of the HIH Royal Commission. An obvious concern about the overlap of responsibilities led to the adoption of the Protocol. This is not a very orderly way of running a legal system and by this I am in no way criticizing Justice Owen. He and ASIC tried to make the best of a bad job and he approached his task with diligence and fairness in very difficult circumstances.
On the wisdom of using serving judges on Royal Commissions in the corporate governance area I remain sceptical. There are a number of serious arguments against including a possible constitutional argument and there is the residual question of the wisdom of incurring the immense cost and delay of a Royal Commission such as the HIH Royal Commission 85 . In any event I appreciate that these matters raise questions of broader public policy, which lie outside the province of the judges to decide but on which the judiciary has a legitimate point of view. 
APPENDIX 1 JUSTICE SANTOW'S PRINCIPLES
1. Disqualification orders are designed to protect the public from the harmful use of the corporate structure or from use that is contrary to proper commercial standards.
2.
The banning order is designed to protect the public by seeking to safeguard the public interest in the transparency and accountability of companies and in the suitability of directors to hold office.
3.
Protection of the public also envisages protection of individuals that deal with companies, including consumers, creditors, shareholders and investors.
4.
The banning order is protective against present and future misuse of the corporate structure.
5.
The order has a motive of personal deterrence, though it is not punitive.
6. The objects of general deterrence are also sought to be achieved.
7.
In assessing the fitness of an individual to manage a company, it is necessary that they have an understanding of the proper role of the company director and the duty of due diligence that is owed to the company.
8.
Longer periods of disqualification are reserved for cases where contraventions have been a serious nature such as those involving dishonesty.
9.
In assessing an appropriate length of prohibition, consideration has been given to the degree of seriousness of the contraventions, the propensity that the defendant may engage in similar conduct in the future and the likely harm that may be caused to the public.
10. It is necessary to balance the personal hardship to the defendant against the public interest and the need for protection of the public from any repeat of the conduct.
11. A mitigating factor in considering a period of disqualification is the likelihood of the defendant reforming.
12. The eight criteria to govern the exercise of the court's powers of disqualification set out in Commissioner for Corporate Affairs (WA) v Ekamper (1987) 12 ACLR 519 have been influential.
13. Factors which led to the imposition of the longest periods of disqualification (that is disqualification of 25 years or more) were:
large financial losses; high propensity that defendants may engage in similar activities or conduct; activities undertaken in fields in which there was potential to do great financial damage such as in management and financial consultancy; lack of contrition or remorse; disregard for law and compliance with corporate regulations; dishonesty and intent to defraud; previous convictions and contraventions for similar activities.
It was held that in making such an order it is necessary to assess:
character of the offenders; nature of the breaches; structure of the companies and the nature of their business; interests of shareholders, creditors and employees; risks to others from the continuation of offenders as company directors; honesty and competence of offenders; hardship to offenders and their personal and commercial interests; and offenders' appreciation that future breaches could result in future proceedings.
14. In cases in which the period of disqualification ranged from 7-12 years, the factors evident and which lead to the conclusion that these cases were serious though not "worst cases", included:
serious incompetence and irresponsibility; substantial loss; defendants had engaged in deliberate courses of conduct to enrich themselves at others' expense, but with lesser degrees of dishonesty; continued, knowing and willful contraventions of the law and disregard for legal obligations; lack of contrition or acceptance of responsibility, but as against that, the prospect that the individual may reform.
15. The factors leading to the shortest disqualifications, that is disqualifications for up to 3 years were:
although the defendants had personally gained from the conduct, they had endeavoured to repay or partially repay the amounts misappropriated; the defendants had no immediate or discernible future intention to hold a position as manager of a company; in ASC v Donovan (1998) 28 ACSR 583 the respondent had expressed remorse and contrition, acted on advice of professionals and had not contested the proceedings.
16. That the object of the disqualification power is the protection of the public, with its corollary of personal deterrence, does not mean that its aim should be punitive although personal deterrence is relevant.
17. The discretion of the court is directed to the nature of the relevant person's conduct in relation to the management, business or property of any corporation. It is also directed more broadly, to any other matters that the court considers appropriate, once the court is satisfied that the disqualification is justified.
18. Lack of contrition has a direct bearing upon disqualification, it favours disqualification and moreover a lengthy period of it. It should not be ignored where a potential for criminal prosecution remains.
19. The public protective purpose must clearly be paramount. That precludes a simple balancing exercise. While a disqualification order should not be disproportionate to the public purpose it is intended to serve, for that indeed would be punitive, it would subvert that public purpose if private interest considerations were to prevail or preclude an order or preclude an order which went further than necessary to serve that public purpose. A lesser period of disqualification than that, designed to serve a private interest consideration, would thus sacrifice the public interest to be protected.
20. There is an absence of any express provision in Section 1317H of the Corporations Act 2001 providing for apportionment of compensation between defendants. Accordingly, the conventional approach as applied to multiple tortfeasors is appropriate and the plaintiff is entitled to recover the whole of the amount of loss against any one defendant but may, of course, only recover in total the full amount of that loss. The court can, however, conclude in relation to a particular defendant that in the circumstances no compensation order should be made.
21. It is well established that the principal purpose of a pecuniary penalty is to act as a personal deterrent to the general public against a repetition of like conduct.
22. As with banning orders there is no simple mechanical process for quantifying the appropriate penalty but guidance can be obtained from the following:
a)
The pecuniary penalty has a punitive character, but it is principally a personal and general deterrent to prevent the corporate structure from being used in a manner contrary to commercial standards. The penalty should be no greater than is necessary to achieve this object.
b)
To determine whether compensation is to be paid and in what amount it is necessary to consider the prospect of the respondent paying such compensation and the hardship to the defendant from such payment. Compensation has been ordered for an amount less than that lost even though there was little prospect of any of it being recovered.
c) The capacity of the defendant to pay is a relevant consideration in determining a pecuniary penalty.
d)
In addressing a pecuniary penalty it is important to consider the consequences of an associated disqualification order for the defendant. If the making of such an order has significant consequences, they may operate as a factor in favour of a lesser penalty. Where the disqualification order does not have significant consequences for the defendant, the prohibition order is likely to be only marginally relevant.
e) It is important to assess whether the order will prejudice the rehabilitation of the defendant.
f) The size of the penalty is a question of discretion. A reference to a director, officer, employee, auditor, actuary, adviser or agent includes a reference to a former director, officer, employee, auditor, actuary, adviser or agent;
A reference to a decision or action includes a failure to make a decision or take an action;
A reference to the exercise of a power includes a failure to exercise a power;
A reference to the discharge of a responsibility or obligation includes a failure to discharge a responsibility or obligation;
A reference to related bodies corporate and related entities includes such bodies irrespective of whether they were so related at the time of the matters being inquired into.
AND, noting that the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) is also investigating certain matters relating to the failure of HIH, and without limiting in any way the scope of your inquiry, We declare that you should, to the extent practicable, co-operate with ASIC and conduct your inquiry with a view to avoiding:
(a) any duplication of ASIC's investigation; and (b) any adverse impact on any civil or criminal proceeding arising out of ASIC's investigation.
AND you may choose not to inquire into certain matters otherwise within the scope of these Letters Patent, but any such decision must be yours alone.
AND We declare that you are authorised to conduct your inquiry under these Letters Patent in combination with any inquiry into matters referred to in these Letters Patent that you are directed or authorised to make by any Commission issued, or pursuant to any order or appointment made, by any of the Governors of the States. 
2.
The Letters Patent note that ASIC is also investigating certain matters relating to the failure of HIH and declare that, without limiting the scope of the inquiry, the Commission should, to the extent practicable, co-operate with ASIC and conduct its inquiry with a view to avoiding:
(a) any duplication of ASIC's investigation, and (b) any adverse impact on any civil or criminal proceedings arising out of ASIC's investigation.
3.
The Commission is authorized, at its discretion, not to inquire into certain matters otherwise within the scope of the Letters Patent.
4.
The Commission is required to report on its inquiry not later than 30 June 2002.
5.
The initial focus of the Commission's inquiry is directed to the reasons for and circumstances surrounding the failure of HIH. 10. Pursuant to section 127 (28) of the ASIC Act, ASIC is authorised to disclose information to a Royal Commission.
Considerations
11. Although ASIC's investigation and the Commission's inquiry are separate independent inquiries with different objectives, ASIC and the Commission recognize the inevitability of some overlap between ASIC's investigation and the Commission's inquiry , and a degree of correspondence between their respective objectives, and are mindful of the need for responsible stewardship of the public resources made available to them.
12. ASIC and the Commission have agreed on the need for a Protocol on cooperation and exchange of information between them in order to assist in the efficient and effective conduct of both the Commission's inquiry and ASIC's continuing investigations and proceedings and to avoid as far as possible:
(a) any duplication of the Commission's inquiry and ASIC's investigations, and (b) any adverse impact on any civil or criminal proceeding arising out of ASIC's investigations.
13. ASIC and the Commission recognize that it is in the interest of each of them to develop and implement the Protocol in a spirit of good will and mutual cooperation.
Agreed approach
14. ASIC and the Commission agree that, to the extent permitted by law:-(a) ASIC will provide the Commission with information obtained during the course of its investigations which, in ASIC's view, will assist the Commission to inquire into the matters falling within the scope of the Commission's terms of reference, save that nothing in this Protocol (including, without limitation, Clause 15) imposes any obligation upon ASIC to provide information if ASIC takes the view that:-(i) disclosure of the information would impact adversely upon ASIC's investigations or on any proceedings arising out of such investigators; or (ii) the information is subject to a valid claim of legal professional privilege or would, if sought by the Commission by way of summons issued to ASIC, be the subject of a valid claim for public interest immunity; or (iii) the information has been obtained or derived from documents obtained by ASIC under warrants issued pursuant to the Crimes Act 1914; or (iv) the information is information that has not been obtained or derived from documents or other material in the possession of both ASIC and the Commission.
(b) The Commission will provide to ASIC any information or evidence which it obtains in the course of its inquiry that relates or may relate to a contravention of a law or evidence of a contravention of a law the administration or enforcement of which ASIC is responsible, if the Commission forms the opinion that it is appropriate so to do, save that if the contravention, if established, would give rise to criminal proceedings, the Commission will consult with ASIC as to whether to communicate the information or furnish the evidence to ASIC or, as the case may be, to the Director of Public Prosecutions.
The information provided by ASIC and the Commission will be provided in writing.
15. Pursuant to Clause 14 and to facilitate the performance of the functions of each of ASIC and the Commission and having regard to the considerations referred to in the Introduction to this Protocol ASIC will, to the extent permitted by law:-(a) as soon as practicable after the date of this Protocol inform the Commission of the nature and scope of its investigations up to that date; and (b) from time to time inform the Commission of the nature and scope of ASIC's continuing investigations.
ASIC will provide this information to the Commission in writing.
16. Nothing in this Protocol shall prevent representatives of ASIC and the Commission from meeting to discuss the information, which has been provided in writing.
17. The Commission will keep any information supplied by ASIC pursuant to Clauses 14 and 15 confidential to itself, its staff and consultants and will use the information only in the furtherance of its functions.
18. To facilitate the performance of the functions of each of ASIC and the Commission and having regard to the terms of this protocol, the Commission will:-(a) provide ASIC with copies of any summons or notice to produce which the Commission has issued or issues in the future to third parties in connection with its inquiry, save that this Protocol will not oblige the Commission to provide ASIC with a copy of any summons relating to a hearing which is to be conducted by the Commission in private;
(b) inform ASIC of the persons whom the Commission wishes to give evidence before the Commission and the rubric of the evidence-ir1-chief which the Commission desires to lead from such persons; and (c) otherwise inform ASIC from time to time of any matters which in the Commission's view will assist ASIC to conduct the investigations described in Clause 8 unless: (i) the disclosure is not permitted by law; or (ii) the Commission takes the view that the disclosure would impact adversely upon the Commission's inquiry.
19. T o further facilitate the performance of the functions of each of ASIC and the Commission and having regard to the terms of this Protocol:-(a) ASIC has produced to the Commission, in answer to summonses addressed to ASIC, documents obtained by ASIC in the course of its investigations to date. ASIC will provide reasonable assistance, to the extent practicable having regard to the availability of ASIC's resources, to the Commission to identify the documents which in ASIC's view are relevant to the Commission's terms of reference; (b) ASIC will inform the Commission of any further notices it issues under Division 2 or Division 3 of Part 3 of the ASIC Act.
20. Prior to the issue of any further summons or notice to produce to ASIC, the Commission will provide ASIC with notice of the terms of such proposed summons or notice and will consult with ASIC in good faith with a view to ensuring that any such summons or notice is issued in terms which will best facilitate the performance of the functions of each of ASIC and the Commission. ASIC will promptly advise the Commission of that view and, in so far as is possible without disclosing the information or document in question, the grounds for the formation of that view, following which the Commission and ASIC will consult in good faith with a view to dealing with the documents or information in a way best suited to facilitating the performance of the functions of each of ASIC and the Commission. In the course of such negotiations each party will give all due and appropriate weight to opinions expressed by the other.
22
. If the consultations referred to in the preceding paragraph do not result in agreement between ASIC and the Commission either party is at liberty to state publicly its position with respect to the issue.
23. The Secretary to the Commission and the Deputy Chair of ASIC will, as circumstances require, meet to discuss the implementation and operation of this Protocol and will, where appropriate, consult in good faith with respect to any desirable amendment to its terms. ASIC and the Commission will establish primary points of contact for day to day communication in accordance with this Protocol.
24. Each of ASIC and the Commission will publish this Protocol on their respective websites and will give such further publicity to its terms as may be agreed. 
